Incentive-based hilsa fisheries management in Bangladesh
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Registered fishers using their ID cards to collect food compensation
Michael Akester
The hilsa shad (Tenualosa ilisha) is the national fish of Bangladesh, supporting the livelihoods of more than 500,000 people, particularly in coastal communities. The Bangladesh government's Department of Fisheries uses incentive-based management to protect its hilsa stocks. Under the Hilsa Fisheries Management Action Plan, all fishing is banned for several months a year in a number of coastal sanctuary areas, and during these periods affected fishing households are offered compensation in the form of rice to improve food security and replace lost income. Other affected households are offered training and support to diversify their income sources. Used in conjunction with adaptive co-management and activities to raise awareness around sustainable fishing practices, this distribution of benefits aims to incentivise compliance with fishing regulations and improve the socioeconomic condition of fishing households.
Last update: 30 Sep 2020
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Context
Challenges addressed
The hilsa shad is of huge economic, social and cultural value to Bangladesh. In the 1970s, hilsa production gradually started to decline, mainly due to overfishing and the degradation of habitat. To halt this decline, the government introduced various fishing regulations including seasonal bans on fishing - both nationwide and in specific hilsa sanctuary areas - with the aim of protecting juvenile and spawning hilsa. Artisanal hilsa fishers generally experience high levels of poverty and vulnerability, and these fishing regulations therefore impose a socioeconomic cost, particularly on those living near sanctuary areas. Capacity for monitoring and enforcement of regulations is also limited.
Location
Bangladesh
South Asia
Process
Summary of the process
Together, the food compensation and alternative income generation support provide the incentive for compliance with hilsa fishery regulations, by compensating for lost earnings. Ultimately, this approach is expected to lead to socioeconomic improvement of hilsa fishing households and an increase in hilsa abundance.
Building Blocks
Food compensation
During seasonal fishing bans, the government distributes sacks of rice to a proportion (around 248,674) of affected households across 15 districts. The scheme was introduced in 2004, with the primary goal of reducing food insecurity and vulnerability, but it also provides an incentive for compliance with fishing regulations, by compensating for income foregone during fishing bans. Based on research led by the International Institute for Environment and Development in partnership with the Bangladesh government's Department of Fisheries, Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies, Bangladesh Fisheries Research Institute and Bangladesh Agricultural University, the scheme has been expanded and redesigned to enhance its effectiveness as an economic incentive. Coverage of affected households has increased by more than seven times since the scheme began, and families now receive 40kg of rice per month for four months, as opposed to the initial 10kg for one to three months. Instances of rice misallocation have also been reduced through the introduction of ID cards for fishers.
Enabling factors
In order to incentivise compliance, compensation must be deemed appropriate and sufficient to offset or reduce the income foregone by abiding by seasonal fishing restrictions. It must be therefore be underpinned by rigorous socioeconomic research.
Success of the incentives also relies on social acceptability, and so activities to raise awareness and understanding of the need for sustainable fishing practices and the importance of compliance with the fishing restrictions are essential.
Lesson learned
The food compensation may have had some negative unintended consequences, including impacts on local rice prices, labour markets, and microfinance markets. Incentive schemes should always investigate and try to mitigate these unintended consequences.
There is also evidence that disproportionate benefits have been accrued by landowners, rather than the most vulnerable, landless fishing households with lowest income levels. This issue highlights the necessity for inclusive incentive schemes to use systematic and positive bias in favour of those most in need.
Similarly, local power structures have limited the impact of providing food compensation to fishing households. Reliance of fishers on middlemen for credit limits their ability to stop fishing during seasonal closures, because they are still bound to repay their debts.
Alternative income generating support
Since 2009, the government has been offering support (e.g. training, refresher courses and micro-credit) to help fishers generate income from alternative livelihoods such as livestock rearing and small businesses. Since 2015, WorldFish has been working with the government to improve this approach in selected communities through a project called 'Enhanced Coastal Fisheries in Bangladesh' (ECOFISH-BD). For example, the project has established Community Savings Groups (CSGs) for women in these communities to enhance saving behaviours of fishing households. Members receive training in financial literacy and the importance of sustainable hilsa fishery management for their livelihoods and wellbeing. They are encouraged to save BDT 100 (just over US$1) every month, and when a CSG hits a saving target of BDT 25,000, ECOFISH matches the saving. This is expected to incentivise further saving and improve the socioeconomic position of fishing households so that they are more able to comply with fishing restrictions and diversify their livelihoods.
Enabling factors
The success of incentives in the form of livelihood diversification support depends on identifying appropriate and socially acceptable types of support. In turn this requires rigorous and participatory assessments of community needs and preferences.
Lesson learned
The government's alternative income generation support had limited uptake and impact due to an initial lack of stakeholder engagement and needs assessment. ECOFISH-BD has been addressing this by identifying more appropriate types of support and establishing the local institutions and adaptive co-management systems required to support livelihood diversification, but it remains to be seen whether these policies and institutions will survive beyond the project's lifespan.
There is also evidence that disproportionate benefits have been accrued by landowners, rather than the most vulnerable, landless fishing households with the lowest income levels. This issue highlights the necessity for inclusive incentive schemes to use systematic and positive bias in favour of those most in need.
Regulatory measures
The government of Bangladesh manages its artisanal hilsa fishery through a number of different regulatory measures, most of which focus on protecting juvenile fish:
- Hilsa fishing is banned throughout the country during the perceived peak breeding season (22 days in October), with the aim of minimising disturbance to spawning and recruitment. Enforcement is focused on areas known to be important spawning grounds.
- There is an eight-month nationwide ban on capture, possession, selling and transport of juvenile hilsa (fry less than 25 cm long) between November and July to maximise recruitment of juveniles to the fishery. Enforcement is focused on 7,000 square kilometres of coastal, estuarine and riverine areas.
- There is a year-round ban on use and production of monofilament gillnets, again for the protection of juvenile hilsa.
- Six hilsa sanctuaries have been designated to protect major hilsa nursery grounds. These sanctuaries range from 20-100 km sections of river. All fishing is banned for at least 2 months in these areas during their peak periods of juvenile presence.
A ‘mobile court’ team operates at the subdistrict level to enforce these regulations, with support from the police and other agencies.
Enabling factors
Effective monitoring and enforcement of fisheries regulations relies on human, physical and financial resources, but these are limited in Bangladesh. In lieu of proper monitoring and enforcement, the provision of compensation enables and incentivises fishers to comply with these regulations by offsetting or reducing the socioeconomic cost.
Lesson learned
The regulations must be grounded in robust ecological and biological research if they are to have a positive impact on hilsa stocks. The geographical placement and seasonal timings of regulations designed to protect hilsa have been adapted over time in response to new scientific evidence.
Impacts
The incentive-based management approach has had a direct socioeconomic impact on hilsa fishing communities in Bangladesh. At least 248,674 fishing households have now received 20-40 kg of rice per month during fishing bans. A smaller number of households have received alternative livelihood support, which has been demonstrated to lead to significant gains in income and assets.
Research suggests that this management approach has contributed to an increase in hilsa production of more than 100% over the last 15 years, which is indicative of an increase in hilsa abundance. This increase in productivity has further benefited hilsa fishers through an increase in fishing income. While it is difficult to evaluate the additional impact of providing incentives for compliance with fishing regulations, as opposed to using regulations alone, it seems likely that the incentives have contributed to a reduction in sanctuary fishing during ban periods. Awareness-raising activities likely strengthened this impact.
However, evidence of increased productivity is spatially variable, suggesting that adverse environmental change could be masking or outweighing benefits from management in some areas. There is also evidence that food and income support does not always reach the most vulnerable fishers, or sufficiently help those stuck in cycles of debt.
Beneficiaries
The direct beneficiaries of this management approach are households in artisanal hilsa fishing communities across 15 districts of Bangladesh. Indirectly, all hilsa fishers benefit from this management, including industrial operators.
Sustainable Development Goals
SDG 1 – No poverty
SDG 2 – Zero hunger
SDG 14 – Life below water
Story
Hilsa shad
Annabelle Bladon
When the Bangladesh government first started distributing compensation to hilsa fishers in 2004, there was very little community input and therefore limited impact. In April 2013, the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) began a four-year project to redesign the approach through rigorous socioeconomic and ecological research and collaboration with the Bangladesh government's Department of Fisheries. IIED partnered with the Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies and Bangladesh Agricultural University, and the project was funded by the UK government's Darwin Initiative.
By establishing trust with high-level government officials at an early stage and working with a diverse group of stakeholders, researchers showed the government how it could improve its approach, making it more efficient, effective, equitable and sustainable. They also demonstrated how modifying the approach could have economic benefits, as well as social and ecological. As a result, the government committed to increasing the coverage of incentives, extending the commitment period, and increasing the amount of support provided to fisher men and women.
The success of this project influenced the joint implementation by the Department of Fisheries and WorldFish of a five-year initiative (2014-2019) funded by USAID, called “Enhanced Coastal Fisheries in Bangladesh (ECOFISH-BD)”. The overall objective of the initiative is to improve the resilience of the Meghna River ecosystem and communities reliant on coastal fisheries in Bangladesh. A key component of these efforts involved supporting women’s access to resources and technologies for livelihood diversification and community resilience improvement fishing ban periods.
Together, these initatives have strengthened the incentive-based approach used in Bangladesh by lessening the hardship imposed on vulnerable fishing communities, and contributed to a significant increase in hilsa productivity across the country.
